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DOES THE CONSTITUTION REQUIRE A
PURELY SECULAR SOCIETY?
David W. Louisell*
"Truth is violated by falsehood, but it is outraged by
silence."-Henri Frederic Amiel
The Supreme Court last confronted the establishment clause of the first
amendment' in 1975, in Meek v. Pittenger.2 There, in a 6-3 deci-
sion, the Court held unconstitutional state-rendered auxiliary services such
as speech and hearing therapy to handicapped Pennsylvania nonpublic school
children. Even though the therapeutic services were given by public school
specialists, they were held to violate the establishment clause because they
were rendered on parochial school premises. Dissenting from this drastic de-
cision, Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justice White, said:
The Court apparently believes that the Establishment Clause of
the First Amendment not only mandates religious neutrality on
the part of government but also requires that this Court go further
and throw its weight on the side of those who believe that our so-
ciety as a whole should be a purely secular one.8
How could handicapped children be denied therapeutic aids just because,
in fulfillment of obligations of conscience, they were in attendance at non-
public schools? Would not the constitutional requirement of equal protection
of the law seem to mandate a directly contrary result?
The Constitution itself says little about religion. Religious tests for federal
officers are precluded,4 Sundays are exempt as relevant days in limiting the
* Elizabeth Josselyn Boalt Professor of Law, University of California, Berkeley.
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In addition to the paper delivered to the AALS Section on Law and Religion, this
article is also based on Professor Louisell's Bicentennial Address at the Law School of
Loyola University, New Orleans, delivered April 2, 1976.
1. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion.
U.S. CONST. art. I.
2. 421 U.S. 349 (1975). After delivery of the address on which this paper is based,
the Court upheld, 5-4, noncategorical aid to eligible religious colleges. Roemer v.
Board of Pub. Works, 96 S. Ct. 2337 (1976).
3. 421 U.S. at 395.
4. The Senators and Representatives . . . and the Members of the several
State Legislatures, and all executive and judicial Officers, both of the
United States and of the several States, shall be bound by Oath or Affirma-
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presidential veto,5 and the document is dated "in the Year of our Lord."
Otherwise, the only reference to religion appears in the first amendment
which provides simply: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establish-
ment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . ." How could
such language preclude the speech and hearing therapy for nonpublic school
children which had been provided by Pennsylvania law for all children?
The religion clauses, like all of the first 10 amendments, were originally
intended as limitations on the federal government only, hence the language
"Congress shall make no law . . . ." Their assimilation by the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment so as to be operable against the states
and their subdivisions is a development of this century.6 The author cannot
here retrace the familiar history save to note that whereas the incorporation
of the free exercise clause into due process was a natural evolution in the
nationalization of American civil rights after the War Between the States,
no one has satisfactorily explained how the due process clause could absorb
the establishment of religion clause. 7 After all, the purpose of the estab-
lishment clause was to protect then-existing state establishments of religion
against federal encroachment. 8
But taking without question the now accepted doctrine that both religion
clauses operate on all units of government in this country, could a prohibition
against establishment of religion be construed to deny the same therapy to
nonpublic school children that is accorded their peers in the public schools?
Note that the question is not whether a state is forced by the Constitution
to treat all its comparable children alike-which would seem on its face a
reasonable proposition in view of the equal protection clause; rather, the
question is whether a state is constitutionally prevented from doing so. The
Court's answer was "yes," because the therapy was rendered on parochial
school premises.
The Chief Justice, also dissenting in Meek, observed:
To hold, as the Court now does, that the Constitution permits the
States to give special assistance to some of its children whose
handicaps prevent their deriving the benefit normally anticipated
tion to support this Constitution; but no religious Test shall ever be required
as a Qualification to any Office or public Trust under the United States.
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3.
5. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
6. See Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943); Cantwell v. Connecticut,
310 U.S. 296 (1940).
7. See Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 253-58 (1963) (Brennan,
J., concurring).
8. See Louisell & Jackson, Religion, Theology and Public Higher Education, 50
CALIF. L. REV. 751, 753 n.9 (1962).
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from the education required to become a productive member of so-
ciety and, at the same time, to deny those benefits to other children
only because they attend a Lutheran, Catholic or other church-
sponsored school does not simply tilt the Constitution against re-
ligion; it literally turns the Religion Clauses on their heads.9
Is the Court throwing its weight toward a purely secular society and tilt-
ing the Constitution against religion? If so, it has performed a considerable
volte-face, at least as measured against its protestations of even relatively
recent years. To recall only several modern cases, in United States v. Bal-
lard,10 decided in 1944, Justice Douglas, writing for the majority, stated that
"It]he First Amendment does not select any one group or any one type of
religion for preferred treatment. It puts them all in that position."" And
a few years later the Court, again speaking through that same staunch pro-
tector against fusion of Church and State, said in Zorach v. Clauson'12:
We are a religious people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme
Being . . . When the state encourages religious instruction or
cooperates with religious authorities by adjusting the schedule of
public events to sectarian needs, it follows the best of our tradi-
tions. . . . [W]e find no constitutional requirement which makes
it necessary for government to be hostile to religion and to throw
its weight against efforts to widen the effective scope of religious
influence.' 3
What has happened? Do the dissenters in Meek v. Pittenger distort the
realities? Or is the Court again "following the election returns" of a per-
ceived twilight of revealed religion, a forthcoming all-pervasive, all-inclusive
social secularism?
As the Court's decisions demonstrate, there are few areas where the need
for objectivity is as great, and its attainment as difficult, as in the re-
ligion cases. If the determinants of one's constitutional views are largely
apt to be functions of one's ultimate value judgments, this is especially true
in the areas of establishment and free exercise. Here, more so than is often
candidly acknowledged, a person's views are likely to be as much or more
shaped by his attitude toward religion, or particular religions, than by the
establishment and free exercise clauses as historical legal instruments.
Hence, the context in which the problem arises may not only set the stage
for adjudication, it may almost become the adjudicator itself. Be the problem
9. 421 U.S. at 386-87.
10. 322 U.S. 78 (1944).
11. Id. at 87.
12. 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
13. Id. at 313-14.
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establishment, free exercise, or both, sympathies and antipathies are largely
fixed by its context, whether the specific issue at bar concerns prayer in
public schools, aid to children in parochial schools, distribution of church
property or prerogatives, draft act exemptions, Sunday-closing laws, or some
other phase of the perennial conflict between societal claims to regulation
and individual claims to freedom.14
Perhaps the above point of the significance of the context in which estab-
lishment and free exercise cases arise can most briefly be made by noting the
attitudes of several Justices. Justice Stewart, dissenting in the New York Re-
gents' prayer case, Engel v. Vitale,15 involving prayer in public schools, said:
"I cannot see how an 'official religion' is established by letting those who want
to say a prayer say it."16 It was this same Justice Stewart who recently wrote
for the Court in Meek,' 7 denying speech and hearing therapy to disabled
school children just because they were in attendance at parochial schools.
Justice Douglas, in the New York released-time case, Zorach v. Clau-
son,'8 said: "We are a religious people whose institutions presuppose a Su-
preme Being."' 9 It was also Justice Douglas who, concurring in Lemon v.
Kurtzman,20 which held unconstitutional state aid for nonpublic school sal-
aries, said: "One can imagine what a religious zealot, as contrasted to a
civil libertarian, can do with the Reformation or with the Inquisition."'21
This prompted an historian to comment: "Only civil libertarians, apparently,
are fit teachers to be paid from the common treasury. '22
How has the majority of the Court come to its present stance on the
religion clauses? Most of the development is recent, having come during or
after World War II. There were a few earlier cases, although some of them,
despite their significance, were only peripheral to the religion clauses as such.
For example, Pierce v. Society of Sisters,23 decided in 1925, sustained, on
the ground of parental rights, a challenge by private and parochial schools
to an Oregon law which, in effect, would have abolished them. In 1930,
Cochran v. Louisiana State Board of Education24 held that Louisiana
14. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), which upheld Amish claims to
exemption from compulsory public high school attendance.
15. 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
16. Id. at 445.
17. 421 U.S. 349 (1975).
18. 343 U.S. 306 (1962).
19. Id. at 313.
20. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
21. Id. at 635-36.
22. MORGAN, THE SUPREME COURT AND RELIGION 111 (1972).
23. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
24. 281 U.S. 370 (1930).
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had not violated due process by spending state funds for school books
in parochial as well as public schools. True, a few earlier cases did
go off on first amendment grounds, as, for example, Reynolds v. United
States,25 decided in 1878, which affirmed a conviction for bigamy over
the claim of religious freedom. There were also a few early establish-
ment clause cases, such as the Court's 1899 decision in Bradfield v. Ro-
berts,26 which sustained a federal appropriation for the construction of a pub-
lic ward to be administered as part of a hospital under the control of an
order of religious sisters.
This is not the occasion for a detailed review of the holdings and dicta
of the earlier cases, which I have attempted elsewhere. 27 In summary, those
cases were consonant with the traditional American viewpoint that religion
and its practice, when not opposed to the peace and good order of the state,
enjoyed a preferred status in accord with the proclamation of the Northwest
Ordinance of 1787 which antedated the Constitution. That Ordinance,
which provided for government of the Northwest Territory, stated: "Reli-
gion, morality and knowledge being necessary to good government and the
happiness of mankind, schools and the means of education shall forever be
encouraged. ' '28
The burgeoning of current establishment clause teaching, and, I submit,
the reversal of the historic American judicial approach to religion, occurred
in 1947 in Everson v. Board of Education.29 That case upheld, although
only by a 5-4 majority, New Jersey's authorization of reimbursement to
parents for money spent for the transportion of their parochial school children
on buses operated by the public transportation system. Those who took com-
fort in the actual holding perhaps overlooked the fateful dictum put forth
by Justice Black, who wrote for the Court in that case, and who remained
for the many years of his tenure the dominant figure on establishment teach-
ing. That dictum, reduced to its essence, is: "Neither a state nor the Federal
Government. . . can pass laws which. . . aid all religions." 80
That dictum has been the Court's lodestar ever since. It controlled the
decision a year later in McCollum v. Board of Education,8 ' where the Court
struck down the Illinois plan for released-time voluntary and multi-de-
25. 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
26. 175 U.S. 291 (1899).
27. Louisell & Jackson, Religion, Theology and Public Higher Education, 50 CALIF.
L REv. 751 (1962).
28. Northwest Ordinance of 1787, art. III.
29. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
30. Id. at 15-16.
31. 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
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nominational religious instruction on public school premises. Zorach v.
Clauson,8 2 with its classic language, "We are a religious people whose in-
stitutions presuppose a Supreme Being, '83 may have engendered for the mo-
ment a reasonable expectation that the Court was again back on the tradi-
tional path of recognition of the historic realities of American life. Zorach
allowed released-time religious instruction off the public school premises.
But the Zorach Court lifted the promise only to break it in the subsequent
New York Regents' prayer and Bible-reading cases.34 Of these cases, Bren-
dan Brown has written:
In the prayer cases, the Court used the doctrine of judicial su-
premacy to declare unconstitutional an activity which would
strengthen the concept of natural law. It was repudiating the
philosophy of those who wrote the Constitution, and the rationale
behind the great constitutional decisions of Marshall, Story, and
many others in the formative period of the United States. The
words of a document like the Constitution take on a meaning only
insofar as they are interpreted within the framework of a specific
philosophy. 5
The Lutheran, Peter Berger, pointing out how extensively the new secular-
ism has succeeded in influencing both the courts and other agencies of gov-
ernment even though it is only since World War II that an overtly secularist
tendency has developed in America, said, "[T]he decision of the Supreme
Court declaring prayer in public school to be unconstitutional was a symbolic
climax of this development." 36
The denouement of the "no aid to religion" dictum, up to this moment
at least, is Meek v. Pittenger, with which this article began and of which the
Chief Justice said: "It literally turns the religion clauses on their heads." 37
Putting aside, so far as possible, subjective value judgments grounded in
attitudes toward religion, perhaps the strongest case for the thesis that the
Court is tilting against religion is based upon its use of its new "divisive"
teaching. For it now seems to be doctrine that a state violates the establish-
ment clause when it effectuates a policy that results from a political contest
32. 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
33. Id. at 313-14.
34. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962); Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374
U.S. 203 (1963). See Louisell, The Man and the Mountain: Douglas on Religious
Freedom, 73 YALE L.J. 975 (1964).
35. Brown, Individual Liberty and the Common Good-the Balance: Prayer, Capital
Punishment, Abortion, 20 CAm. LAw. 213, 220 (1974).
36. Berger, Battered Pillars of the American System: Religion, FORTUNE, Apr. 1975,
at 138.
37. 421 U.S. at 387.
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wherein some of the politically successful partisans were religiously moti-
vated.38 This, of course, is only another way of saying that a citizen is effec-
tively precluded from the democratic arena if his motive for entering it is
based upon religious conviction. The fact that on its face this doctrine would
seem repugnant to the nonreligion provisions of the first amendment, ren-
ders it no less significant as a controlling principle of decision. ,Indeed, one
can only be amazed at how a Court so staunch in upholding free speech even
in the severest context of direct confrontation with a government's military
purposes,89 could simultaneously innovate the divisive doctrine-unless in-
deed it is "tilting" against religion and throwing its weight to a purely secular
society.
The divisive doctrine may be the psychological root of other less direct
but hardly less meaningful "tilts" against religion. What the Court has re-
cently done to the significance of marriage as a relevant juridical factor is
the subject of an incisive inquiry by Professor John T. Noonan, Jr.40 As
he noted, the Court has gone far in prohibiting the states from acknowledging
marriage as a permissible legal criterion in the regulation of sexual conduct,
going out of its way in Eisenstadt v. Baird41 "to deny the legal metaphor,
founded on the religious metaphor in Genesis, that man and wife are one
flesh." 4 2  Thus discrimination between the married and the unmarried for
purposes of regulating sexual conduct is unconstitutional.4 3
In contrasting Griswold v. Connecticut 44 with Eisenstadt v. Baird, Pro-'
fessor Noonan pointed out that when the constitutional right to privacy was
first announced in Griswold, it was a right to marital privacy: there could
be no state invasion of the "sacred precincts" of the marital bedroom. 4 5 He
then remarked, "[h]ow quickly marital privacy became procreative privacy.
How remarkably a right flowing from the institution of marriage became a
barrier to the fostering of the institution."'46
How far away from the Judaeo-Christian tradition must America move
to make sure that it is not establishing religion by effectuating as public policy
38. See id. at 372; Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 794 (1973);-
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 622 (1971).
39. See New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) .(Pentagon Pa-
pers case).
40. Noonan, The Family and the Supreme Court, 23 CATH. U.L. REV. 255 (1973).
41. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
42. Noonan, supra note 40, at 260.
43. See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) (right to hearing on custody of
children of an unmarried father).
44. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
45. Id. at 483-85.
46, Noonan, supra note 40, at 266.
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a viewpoint that ultimately is traceable to the religious conviction of the
Judaeo-Christian tradition? How many issues must be removed from the
democratic political arena because partisans therein are religiously moti-
vated?
,But there is perhaps a more subtle way in which the Court is tilting the
Constitution against religion: I refer to the abortion decisions of 1973, Roe
v. Wade47 and Doe v. Bolton.48 It is unnecessary to review those decisions
in detail here; I have elsewhere undertaken comprehensive review of the
law's tragic surrender to permissive abortion forces in general and those deci-
sions in particular. 49 My purpose here is simply to note that in these anti-
scientific and anti-biological decisions the Court, under the pretext of dis-
claiming theological approaches, has fallen into a subjective theologism of
its own replacing the historic and venerable theologies of the Western tra-
ditions.
Thus Justice Blackmun, writing for the Court in Roe, stated:
We need not resolve the difficult question of when life begins.
When those trained in the respective disciplines of medicine,
philosophy, and theology are unable to arrive at any consensus,
the judiciary, at this point in the development of man's knowledge,
is not in a position to speculate as to the answer.50
One would expect, in accordance with logic, history, and constitutional doc-
trine, that the next premise would be: therefore, while lack of certainty pre-
vails, the judgment is necessarily in the legislative domain. But instead, the
Court indulged not only in the abjured speculation, but in dogmatic value
judgments of its own. The unborn represent only potential human life,5"
and have only partial human personhood;5 2 human life, to be worthy of pro-
tection, must be "meaningful." 53
What has the Court's own theologism as to the nature and meaning of
human life let loose upon American society? We have by judicial fiat-
by "an exercise of raw judicial power," as said by Justices White and Rehn-
quist dissenting in Roe54 -a permissiveness for abortion unmatched, I believe,
47. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
48. 410 U.S. 179 (1973). See also Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 96 S. Ct.
2831 (1976).
49. Louisell, Abortion, the Practice of Medicine and the Due Process of Law, 16
U.C.L.A.L. RE,. 233 (1969); Louisell, The Burdick Proposal: A Life-Support Amend-
ment, 1 HUMAN LIFu REV. 9 (1975).
50. 410 U.S. at 159.
51. Id. at 162.
52. Id. at 157-62.
53. Id. at 163. Cf. Commonwealth v. Edelin, 45 U.S.L.W. 2312 (Mass. Sup. Jud. Ct.
Dec. 17, 1976).
• 54. 410 U.S. at 222.
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anywhere in the world, even by legislative action. Currently, the saline solu-
tion to induce later abortions is giving way to prostaglandin, as less injurious
to the mother. But prostaglandin frequently causes a living infant to emerge.
Eminent gynecologists have informed me that in some places an additional
substance is used with the prostaglandin to insure that the fetus will not
emerge alive. Thus does the new-found constitutional right of "privacy"
mature into the deliberate purpose to kill.
But from the viewpoint of the individual conscience, perhaps even more
significant than Roe and Doe themselves, are those cases under their aegis
which hold: (1) that the husband has no right to object to an abortion on
his wife, nor parents to object to (or even know about) an abortion on a
minor daughter; 5 (2) that municipal, tax-supported hospitals must perform
elective abortions, however abhorrent they may be to the consciences of cer-
tain of the taxpayers; 56 and, (3) that Medicaid under the Social Security
Act must pay for elective abortions, or even that, regardless of statutory con-
siderations, equal protection of the law constitutionally requires that elective
abortions be paid for by the government. 57 Let us examine the Roe and Doe
teachings and their progeny in the light of the newly formulated divisive
doctrine already discussed, that government violates the establishment clause
when it effectuates a policy that results from the political process wherein
some of the successful partisans were religiously motivated. A telling indi-
cation of the results of this doctrine is afforded by the attitude of a number of
senators on the Senate Subcommittee on Constitutional Amendments of the
Committee on the Judiciary. The Chairman, Senator Bayh of Indiana, and
Senator Mathias of Maryland, took the position that although they per-
sonally believed that unborn life is indeed human life, they felt restrained
from effectuating that belief in law because it was interpretable as grounded
in religious opinion. In commenting on this, the distinguished theologian and
historian Harold O.J. Brown, in 'his discussion of the Ethical Questions in
Fetal Research, has said.
If the First Amendment is understood (as the Court now seems
to understand it) as a prohibition of any governmental recognition
of fundamental convictions of a religious origin, then it means
55 See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 96 S. Ct. 2831 (1976); Baird v.
Bellotti, 393 F. Supp. 847 (D. Mass. 1975), vacated and remanded, 96 S. Ct. 2857
(1976).
56. See, e.g., Doe v. Poelker, 497 F.2d 1063 (8th Cir. 1974), affirmed on rehearing,
515 F.2d 541 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. granted, 96 S. Ct. 3220 (1976); Nyberg v. City of
Virginia, 495 F.2d 1342 (8th Cir. 1974). Even private hospitals have now been held
to be under the sway of all but permissive abortion. See Doe v. Bridgeton Hospital
Ass'n, 71 N.J. 748, 386 A.2d 641 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1976).
57. See, e.g., Wulff v. Singleton, 508 F.2d 1211 (8th Cir. 1975), remanded to dis-
[Vol. 26:20
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something it surely never was intended to mean: the cutting off
of American society from its spiritual and cultural roots in the
Judaeo-Christian tradition."8
One may interject that the Court is not responsible for such senatorial extrem-
ism and irresponsibility. But from whence did the position of these senators
derive, if not from the Court's new divisive teaching?
But the most startling result of the conjuncture of Roe and Doe with the
divisive teaching is the position taken by the United States Commission on
Civil Rights. For we are now told by this organization that attempted correc-
tion of Roe and Doe by an anti-abortion law or constitutional amendment
would not pass the muster of the Court's establishment clause doctrine.
Lest you think I am only indulging in a professional brain-teaser, note the
Commission's exact words:
In a recent Supreme Court case, Mr. Justice Powell explained the
evils protected against by the establishment clause .... According
to Powell, in order ". . . to pass muster under the Establishment
Clause, the law in question, first, must reflect a clearly secular
legislative purpose . . . second, must have a primary effect that
neither advances nor inhibits religion . . . and, third, must avoid
excessive government entanglement with religion.. ." [citing Com-
mittee for Public Education v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 773 (1972)].
An anti-abortion law or constitutional amendment would not pass
such muster. There is no clearly secular legislative purpose, there
is a primary effect that advances certain religious institutions, and
there would be excessive government entanglement with religion in
the enactment and ever present in the enforcement of the provi-
sions.59
There you have it! Roe and Doe, which negated the historic and universal
American legislative power to restrict abortion, were secular and good; an
attempt to correct them by constitutional amendment would be religious and
bad.
The Commission's report goes on to attack conscience clauses protecting
those opposed to abortion.6 0 I submit that it is both ironic and tragic that
a commission established to protect minority rights, now, in the name of com-
trict court for defense on merits, 96 S. Ct. 2868 (1976). The latest incredible doctrine
is that Congress is powerless to refuse to appropriate funds for permissive abortions.
McRae v. Matthews, 421 F. Supp. 533 (E.D.N.Y. 1976).
58. Brown, Ethical Questions In Fetal Research, 1 HUMAN LIFE REV. 118, 124
(1975).
59. CONSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS OF THE RIGHT TO LIMIT CHILDBEARING, REPORT TO
THE UNITED STATES COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS 28-29 (April 1975).
60. Id. at 12.
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pletely unfettered abortion, levies an attack on the most basic of all human
rights-that of conscience.
Is the Constitution being tilted against religion? Candor seems to compel
an amplification and refinement of the question: Is the motivation for the
tilting primarily a particular religion? Professor Victor G. Rosenblum, in
his recent testimony on a proposed constitutional amendment on abortion, re-
ferred to the Civil Rights Commission report, saying:
I am concerned deeply ...over the innuendo that borders on
religious prejudice contained in... the [Civil Rights] Commission's
report . . . that contends, "[a]dditionally, raising a particularly
religious view of personhood to the level of constitutionality would
be widely regarded as a constraint on the free exercise of religion
and an attack upon the Constitution itself." [p. 96]. . . .That
the Civil Rights Commission should accept, let alone inject, the
issue of religious partisanship into a basic question of humanity
is a denigration in my judgment of the Commission's mission and
an egregious misconstruction of the central issue posed by abor-
tion.01
The frankness of Professor Rosenblum emboldens me to conclude with an
unpleasant but important subject, the potential factor of anti-Catholicism,
which the historian Arthur Schlesinger, Sr., characterized "as the deepest bias
in the history of the American people."'0 2 The history of intolerance is an
unwelcome recollection and observation, especially for Catholics, but neither
scholarship nor truth is advanced .by blinking at it. Perhaps the spirit of
ecumenical cooperation following Vatican II and the election of a Catholic
president have lulled Americans into believing that all is for the best in the
best of all possible worlds of religious equality and freedom. ,But we cannot
forget, and only euphoria could cause us to overlook, the harsh historical real-
ities of the anti-Catholic tradition in the United States: the burning of the
Ursuline Convent in Massachusetts in 1834; the street fighting in Philadel-
phia 10 years later; the exhortations of Lyman Beecher to resist the Pope's
plan to take over the Mississippi Valley; the American Protestant Association
of the 1840's; the Order of ,United Americans of the 1850's; the Order of
United American Mechanics (which survived from the middle of the
19th to the middle of this century); the Know-Nothing Party; the American
Protective Association (which counted one million secret members in the
1890's); the Blaine Amendment; Al Smith's 1928 campaign for president;
61. Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 197 (1976) (testimony of Prof. Victor
G. Rosenblum).
62. See P. ELLIS, AMERICAN CATHOLICISM 151 (2d ed. 1969).
[Vol. 26:20
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President Truman's frustrated attempts to maintain a representative at the
Vatican; and today's Americans United. 63
Are strains of the historic American antagonism toward Catholicism at
work in the movement to convince the public that abortion is "only a Catholic
issue?" The new-found divisive doctrine, of course, arose in the context of
cases involving aid to parochial school children or schools. A person must
be careful lest his substantive predisposition on that issue becloud his ap-
praisal of the Court's approach as to possible involvement of religious pre-
judice per se. Let us, therefore, in the interests of objectivity and fairness,
turn from cases arguably involving the institutional church, to the Selective
Service Act cases, which perhaps best fill the bill for present purposes.
The 1940 Selective Service Act exempted those who "by reason of religious
training and belief" were opposed to participation in war.64 Cases split over
exemption claims which cited the promptings of an "inward mentor." 65 In
1948, Congress sought to resolve the problem by exempting claims based on
a belief in "a relation to a Supreme Being.1'61
In United States v. Seeger,67 the Court confronted the possibility that
the 1948 Act unconstitutionally established religion by insisting on a belief
in a relation to a Supreme Being. Defendant Seeger would only say that
he preferred to leave the question of such belief open. The Court avoided
the confrontation by a striking verbal pirouette:
We believe that under this construction, the test of belief "in a
relation to a Supreme Being" is whether a given belief that is sin-
cere and meaningful occupies a place in the life of its possessor
parallel to that filled by the orthodox belief in God of one who
clearly qualifies for the exemption. 8
In Welsh v. United States,69 the Court heard a defendant who refused to
claim any religious belief. He prevailed because, according to Justice Black
writing for the Court, his belief that taking life was morally wrong was held
with a fervor equal to that of traditional religious convictions, and section
6(j) of the Act required no more. 7)
One year after Welsh, Negre, a Catholic with the religious obligation to
63. See generally MORGAN, THE SUPREME COURT AND RELIGION 46-52 (1972).
64. Act of September 16, 1940, ch. 720, § 5(g), 54 Stat. 889. (current version at
50 U.S.C. § 456(j) (1970)).
65. Compare Berman v. United States, 156 F.2d 377 (9th Cir. 1946), with United
States v. Kauten, 133 F.2d 703 (2d Cir. 1943).
66. Act of June 24, 1948, ch. 625, § 6(j), 62 Stat. 612-13.
67. 380 U.S. 163 (1965).
68. Id. at 165-66.
69. 398 U.S. 333 (1970).
70. id. at 343-44.
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distinguish between "just" and "unjust" war and who conscientiously opposed
the Vietnam conflict as unjust, might well have approached the Court with
confidence. 71 The Court had held in Sherbert v. Verner72 that a Sabbatar-
ian had a first amendment right to participate in a state's unemployment in-
surance program even though she refused for religious reasons to adhere to
the state's requirement that she be willing to work on Saturday in order to
participate. Furthermore, in Sicurella v. United States,73 a Jehovah's Witness
who opposed participation in secular wars was held to possess the requisite
conscientious scruples concerning war, although he was not opposed to par-
ticipation in a "theocratic" war commanded by Jehovah. 74
But Negre lost his case; the Court's expansive interpretation of eligibility
for draft exemption suddenly became restrictive. He lost because the af-
firmative purposes underlying conscientious draft exemption were perceived
by the Court to be neutral and secular, and the Court felt that valid neutral
reasons existed for limiting the exemption to objectors to all wars. 75 While
the opinion is a valiant attempt to justify the newly reached strict construc-
tionist mood (it must be acknowledged that on the same day a humanist ob-
jector to particular war was also turned down), the result was too much for
Justice Douglas, the lone dissenter.78  Perhaps the real truth is that those
charged with raising armies feel that they simply cannot afford to tolerate
individual objection to particular wars. But the fact remains that the Court,
which had rescued conscientious draft exemption from unconstitutionality by
equating belief in God with "sincere and meaningful" nonbelief, refused to
acknowledge one of the most venerable and philosophically based of all paci-
fist traditions, that which distinguishes between just and unjust wars.
I have referred to the late Justice Black as the dominant influence in for-
mulation and effectuation of the "no aid to religion" interpretation of the
first amendment. He was one of the ablest legal technicians and shrewdest
tacticians ever to sit on the Supreme Court. We are now told by his son,
Hugo Black, Jr., in his book about his father:
The Ku Klux Klan and Daddy, so far as I could tell only had
one thing in common. He suspected the Catholic Church. He
used to read all of Paul Blanshard's books exposing power abuse in
the Catholic Church. He thought the popes and bishops had too
much power and property .... 77
71. See Negre v. Larson, decided with Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 440-41
(1971).
72. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
73. 348 U.S. 385 (1955).
74. See also Clay v. United States, 403 U.S. 698 (1971).
75. 401 U.S. at 453.
76. Id. at 470.
77. H. BLACK, JR., My FATHER: A REMEMBRANCE 104 (1975).
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We may have to await a definitive biography of the master craftsman of
modem establishment clause teaching to appreciate whether, and to what ex-
tent, anti-Catholic bias motivated his "no aid to religion" philosophy.
In this Bicentennial Year we intuitively feel that our Constitution means
many things. It is a classic apportionment between local and national, be-
tween state and federal, concerns. It contains perhaps mankind's loftiest
statement of the ideal of liberty-the Bill of Rights. Most important of all,
it has operated as a great bill of peace between widely divergent peoples
from coast to coast, conservative to liberal, humanist to religious. As Justice
Holmes said in his classic and now vindicated dissent in Lochner v. New
York:TS "[A Constitution] is made for people of fundamentally differing
views .
We are in jeopardy of ignoring the motivation for the tilt against religion,
but an examination of that motivation must await another time. It is self-
evident, however, that we sadly depart from the realities of human psychol-
ogy and mistake ourselves if we assume that Justices are exempt from the
hubris that prompted the warning that all power corrupts, and absolute power
corrupts absolutely.
But let us not, like mischievous children, seek to cast all responsibility onto
the shoulders of others. A distinguished judge asked me not long ago, re-
ferring to some of the decisions I have discussed here, if I thought the Court
would have trended the way it has if the strength of religious conviction had
not first failed in the hearts and minds of the people? To the extent this
is a valid inquiry, it revives the master observer Shakespeare's trenchant per-
ception, which can be paraphrased: "The fault, dear fellow citizen, lies not in
our Justices, but in ourselves." For example, why does Congress remain inert
in the light of the glaring judicial error of Roe and Doe, except that we our-
selves are passive?
People of religious conviction today often seem quite timid about asserting
their legitimate role in the formulation of their country's public philosophy.
Of course we all know and acknowledge that the first amendment precludes,
and rightly so, preference for any religious denomination. But is there not
a core of common religious understanding at the heart of American institu-
tions--are we not in fact, as once proclaimed, "[a] religious people whose
institutions presuppose a Supreme Being?" Is there not something of a com-
mon denominator that sometimes is identified as America's civil religion? To
illustrate this question, I choose the words of no theologian or churchman,
but of Benjamin Franklin, commonly regarded as among the least Christian
of the founders. Yet he said:
78. 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905).
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I never was without some religious principles. I never doubted,
for instance, the existence of the Deity; that he made the world and
govern'd it by his Providence; that the most acceptable service of
God was the doing of good to men; that our souls are immortal;
and that all crime will be punished, and virtue rewarded either
here or hereafter. These I esteemed the essentials of every reli-
gion; and, being to be found in all religions we had in our country,
I respected them all, tho with different degrees of respect .... 79
Whatever the cause for the tilt against religion, the concern that the Court
is no longer guaranteeing neutrality but is actually throwing its weight toward
a purely secular society and literally turning the establishment clause on its
head is not a trivial one. All fair-minded citizens and believers in the
Constitution, not to mention people of religious conviction, have cause for
concern in this Bicentennial Year of 1976.
79. R. RICHEY & D. JONES, AMERICAN CIVIL RELIGION 26 (1974), quoting B. FRANK-
LIN, AUTOBIOGRAPHY 46 (1964).
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